I. Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is undergoing a renaissance. Thanks for developments in machine learning -particularly, deep learning and reinforcement learning -there has been an explosion in the applications of AI in many settings. In actuality, however, far from providing new forms of machine intelligence in a general fashion, what AI has been able to do has been to reduce the cost of higher quality predictions in a drastic way (Agrawal et.al., 2018) . As deep learning pioneer Geoffrey Hinton put it, "Take any old problem where you have to predict something and you have a lot of data, and deep learning is probably going to make it work better than the existing techniques." (Hinton 2016 ) Thus, when they are able to utilize AI, decision-makers know more about their environment including about future states of the world.
These developments have brought about discussion as to the role of humans in that decision-making process. The view we take here (see also Agrawal et.al., 2017) is that humans still play a critical role in determining the reward functions in decisions. That is, if the decision can be formulated as a problem of choosing an action (x), in the face of uncertainty about the state of the world () with probability distribution function F(), in an ideal setting, an AI can transform that problem from ∫ ( , ) ( ) into ( , )
with actions being made in a state-contingent manner. However, this transformation relies on someone knowing the utility function, ( , ).
We argue that, at present, only a human can develop this knowledge.
That said, the value to understanding the utility function in all of its nuance is enhanced when the decision-maker knows that they will have accurate predictions of the state of the world. This is especially true when it comes to states that are unlikely to arise or as applied to decision-making in complex environments.
Here we develop a model of utility function discovery in the presence of AI. 
II. Model Set-Up
Our baseline model is drawn from Agrawal where > > . In the absence of judgment, the ex ante expectation that the risky action is optimal in state is ; common across states.
That is, is the probability in state that the risky payoff is R rather than r. This is a statement about the payoff, given the state.
In the absence of knowledge regarding the specific payoffs from the risky action, a decision can only be made on the basis of prior probabilities. In this case, the expected payoff from the risky action is ≡ + (1 − ) .
We make the following assumptions: 
III. Judgment Through Experience
Judgment does not come for free. In Agrawal et.al. (2017), we assume that it takes thought (at the cost of time). By contrast, here we assume that judgment arises from experience.
Specifically, an agent must actually experience a given state in order to, potentially, learn the payoffs from that state. If they do not know the state, they cannot learn.
Decision-makers discount with factor  < 1.
If a state arises, there is a probability, , that they will gather enough experience to determine the optimal action in that period and can make a choice based on that judgment.
Otherwise, they can make a decision in the absence of that judgment. Importantly, they cannot learn the payoff associated with the state if they take the default action. Ignorance remains and their per period payoff is S.
The timing of the game is as follows:
(Prediction) The decision-maker is
informed by the AI of the state that period.
2. (Judgment) With probability, 1 − , the decision-maker does not learn the payoffs for the risky action in that state. With probability , the decision-maker gains this knowledge and retains it into the future. And finally, (iii), no experience with expected discounted payoff of:
Thus, there is a learning period of uncertain length followed by a period whereby the agent can apply full experience to decisions into the future earning * on average. As  increases, so does Π, showing that prediction and judgment are complements in this model.
IV. Pricing AI as a Service
Without any judgment or experience, the net present discounted value earned by the agent would be ( − ). Thus, the price in the proposition is the only price that will support full inclusion at the partially experience phase.
Will this price also support inclusion at the fully experience stage; that is, is ≤ 1 2 ( − )?
Note that 2( +4(1− )) < 1 2 so this is satisfied.
Note, however, that We have also shown that for  sufficiently high, any candidate exclusionary price will result it prices that exceed 1 2 ( − ). Thus, for  sufficiently high, the AI provider will not find it profitable to exclude agents at any stage.  Intuitively, when some initial judgment is complete, there is either good news (in that the risky strategy is optimal) or bad news (in which it is not). An inclusion strategy requires price to be low enough that following bad news, learning still occurs. However, while the upside potential for the user following good news is higher than that following bad news, the value of prediction after full experience is gained is the same. Thus, the AI provider has no mechanism by which they can share in the upside. In the absence of that mechanism, they choose to price low and not exclude any users at this stage. Half of the users eventually opt out when they find that either the safe or risky action is dominant. What this means is that an AI provider who cannot implement upfront pricing is restricted in the value they can appropriate. While learning can yield good or bad news to the decision-maker, good news may cause prediction to lose its value as the decision-maker discovers the risky action is dominant. Thus, the AI provider must sacrifice rents in order to ensure that they can capture some rents as the decision-maker gains experience.
Can versioning -selling an AI product which has lower performance -improve this outcome for the AI provider? The intuition would be that until they are fully experienced, users will purchase the lower performing product allowing the AI provider to charge more in the long-term. The downside is a lower performing product may slow the gathering of experience and push that long-term out further. The details of this are left to future work.
V. Judgment Through Experimentation
Using an experience frame to judgment The convenient property of this frame is that it relates the cost of judgment explicitly to the expected cost of experimentation. In particular, as r decreases, experimentation becomes more costly.
These calculations presume that the decisionmaker finds it worthwhile to experiment. If no experiment is undertaken, the present discounted payoff is 1 1− . Thus, it may be the case that there is no value for an AI as the cost of experimentation may be too high.
Even if this were not the case, in assessing the demand for AI under experimentation, we need to consider the fact that decision-makers can use experimentation to discover whether they have dominated actions or not. Depending on v, by running repeated experiments, even in the absence of knowledge of which state has arisen, the decision-maker can potentially infer whether the risky or safe action is preferred in both states. In this case, as we noted earlier, there would be no further demand for an AI.
Working out the full equilibrium outcome under experimentation is beyond the scope of our analysis in this short paper. However, we believe that, in some environments, this could prove to be an interesting driver of the demand for AI and how it evolves.
